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PIERCING THE NONPROFIT CORPORATE VEIL
I. INTRODUCTION
Statistics indicate that as many as one-half of the organi-
zations and enterprises in the United States today are non-
profit in nature.' Many of those nonprofit organizations and
enterprises are corporations.2 In fact, as many as one-fifth of
all of the corporations in the United States are nonprofit and
that proportion is steadily growing. Despite this growth, the
law applicable to nonprofit corporations remains at a re-
markably immature state of development.4  Many legisla-
tures have merely superimposed general corporate law on
nonprofit corporations. 5 Often these enactments merely de-
1. Oleck, Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 962, 962
(1979).
2. Some jurisdictions refer to these corporations as nonprofit while others call
them not-for-profit. Both terms can be used interchangeably since there is no essen-
tial distinction between them. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129
U. PA. L. REV. 497, 501 n.3 (1981). In this comment the term nonprofit corporation
will be used.
3. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 500. The vast array of incorporated charities in-
cludes hospitals, youth centers, museums, the Red Cross and fund raising organiza-
tions which solicit for worthy causes. Other nonprofit corporations include consumer
protection groups, community development leagues, community service organiza-
tions, social groups, country clubs and trade and political associations. Brown, The
Not-For-Profit Corporation Director: Legal Liabilities and Protection, 28 FED'N INS.
CouNs. Q. 57, 58 (1977).
4. Brown, supra note 3, at 58. Nonprofit corporations are currently regulated by
diverse statutory formulations. Some jurisdictions have general corporation statutes
which govern both profit and nonprofit corporations with only minimal distinctions
provided for nonprofit corporations. Other jurisdictions have enacted separate profit
and nonprofit corporation statutes. Still other statutes governing nonprofit corpora-
tions are so scattered throughout the state codes, they defy classification. Henn &
Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Laws of Nonprofit Organizations: Caifornia, Here We
Come, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1103, 1107 (1981). See also I W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2.4 (rev. perm. ed. 1974).
5. Ellman, On Developing a Law of Nonprofit Corporations, ARz. ST. L.J. 153,
154 (1979); Henn & Boyd, supra note 4, at 1104. The Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act was consciously drafted to follow the Model Business Corporation Act as closely
as possible. There are deviations only where necessary. This enables a jurisdiction
adopting the Act to use the large body of case law that has developed through inter-
pretations of the Model Business Corporation Act. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 528.
See generaly MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1964). Those jurisdictions adopting
the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act include: ALA. CODE §§ 10-3-I to -72 (1975);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.20.005-.725 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-1901 to -1921 (1980);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2101 to -3120 (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 317.01-.69 (West
1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.1-1 to -23 (West 1937); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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fine the organizational requirements. For answers to any
other questions, the researcher is directed to the business
corporate law of the particular jurisdiction.6
Incorporation affords a nonprofit organization limited li-
ability, perpetual duration and centralized organization,
while still allowing many of the special state and federal tax
exemptions provided for nonprofit organizations.7 In addi-
tion, the nonprofit structure may be chosen by the incorpora-
tor because of the positive image a nonprofit corporation
conveys to the consuming public." However, the abrogation
of the doctrine of charitable immunity and the emergence of
new bases for liability, such as corporate negligence, 9 means
that nonprofit corporations no longer enjoy special protec-
tions. Moreover, their increased involvement in business en-
terprises has drawn a considerable amount of attention. 0
Owing to their nonprofit nature, caution must be used in de-
fining the powers and duties of their officers, directors and
members and in assuring that the boundaries of permissible
conduct are not overstepped. The confusion surrounding
nonprofit corporate law does not make that task easy.
In particular, it is unclear Whether the corporate disre-
gard doctrine will be applied in many jurisdictions to non-
profit corporations. Because of the basic differences between
profit and nonprofit corporations there are several inherent
problems which will be addressed in this comment." Al-
§§ 1702.01-.99 (Page 1978). Wisconsin adopted the Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act in 1953. Wis. STAT. §§ 181.01-.78 (1953).
6. Ellman, supra note 5, at 154.
7. Taft, Control of Foundations and Other Non-Proftt Corporations, 18 CLEV. ST.
L. REv. 478, 478 (1969); Note, New York's Not-For-Profit Corporate Law, 47 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 761, 761 (1972).
8. Ellman, supra note 5, at 158 n.14. It is suggested that the title "nonprofit" may
be the "most important benefit the state can confer upon any entity. The public reacts
with a disarmed sense of generosity in the face of such a label." Fessler, Codfcation
and the Nonprofit Corporation: The Philosophical Choices, Pragmatic Problems, and
Drafting Difficulties Encountered in the Formulation of A New Alaska Code, 33 MER-
CER L. REv. 543, 547 (1982).
9. Spitz & Zarenski, Liability of a Hospital as an Institution: Are the Walls of
Jerico Tumbling?, 16 FORUM 225, 225 (1980).
10. See generally Fessler, supra note 8; Hansmann, supra note 2, at 500; Henn &
Boyd, supra note 4, at 1104.
11. Gray, Impact oNonprofit Organizations, TRENDS IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZA-
TIONS LAW 1, 7-8 (1977).
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though only a few courts have addressed this issue to date, 12
it is a matter that will require more attention as nonprofit
corporations expand their operations into new areas.
A. Nonprofit Corporations Generaly
"The defining characteristic of a nonprofit corporation is
that it is barred from distributing profits, or net earnings, to
...its directors, officers, or members."' 13 That does not
mean that it is prohibited from earning a profit. Rather, it is
only the distribution of those earnings as dividends that is
prohibited. Net profits, "if any, must be retained and de-
voted to the purposes for which the nonprofit corporation
was formed."'14 Nonprofit corporations generally are "free
to pay reasonable compensation to individuals, including
controlling individuals, for labor services or capital provided
to the organization."' 15
By statute, most nonprofit corporations cannot issue
shares.' 6 Instead, in many cases, certificates of membership
are issued to individuals upon their acceptance into the cor-
poration as members and their payment of dues.'7 Unlike
the shares in a profit corporation, these certificates may not
be freely transferred. 8 While members of a nonprofit corpo-
ration do not have a direct financial stake in the corporation
because they do not receive a return on any contribution to
the corporation, most members do have the right to vote on
the same matters usually decided by shareholders of a profit
corporation. i9
12. See, e.g., Jabczenski v. Southern Pac. Memorial Hosps., 119 Ariz. 15, 579
P.2d 53 (1978); Macaluso v. Jenkins, 95 111. App. 3d 461, 420 N.E.2d 251 (1981); Mac-
fadden v. Macfadden, 46 N.J. Super. 242, 134 A.2d 531 (1957); Revere Press, Inc. v.
Blumberg, 431 Pa. 370, 246 A.2d 407. (1968); Ruppa v. American States Ins. Co., 91
Wis. 2d 628, 284 N.W.2d 318 (1979).
13. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 501. Most legislative enactments define nonprofit
corporations in these terms. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 7111 (West Supp.
1981); Wis. STAT. § 181.02(4) (1979).
14. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 501. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§ 508 (McKinney 1970).
15. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 501.
16. Id. at 502.
17. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 5058 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT CoRP. LAW § 501 (McKinney 1970); Wis. STAT. § 181.11 (1979).
18. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 501 (McKinney 1970).
19. Ellman, supra note 5, at 161.
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A few states, by statute, do permit nonprofit corporations
to organize on a stock basis.20 However, these shares do not
grant a right of return on the members' investment either
during the life of the corporation or upon its termination.2'
The effect of these statutes is to place the members vis-a-vis
the officers, directors and corporation in the same status as in
the business corporation. 22
Although nonprofit corporations traditionally have been
distinguished from profit corporations by the absence of
shareholders, the ban on dividends and a charitable or pub-
lic benefit purpose, these characteristics are gradually being
eroded. There is a trend to liberalize the purposes for which
a nonprofit corporation can be organized.23 In particular,
there is a growing trend for nonprofit corporations to have a
mixture of business and nonprofit purposes.24 Pennsylvania
and New York have "radically altered the permissible scope
of nonprofit corporate activities by allowing them to form
for any lawful business purpose to be conducted on a not-
for-profit basis. 25 Most states that have adopted the Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act allow nonprofit corporations to
be organized "for any lawful purpose. ' 26 This language has
20. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7752(a) (Purdon 1967); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-144
(1981). States that allow nonprofit corporations to issue shares also require that they
note conspicuously on the face of the share certificates that the corporation is non-
profit.
Prior to July 1, 1953, Wisconsin allowed nonprofit corporations to organize on a
nonstock or stock basis. Wis. STAT. §§ 180.02(1), 181.02(1) (1951). However, in 1953
when Wisconsin adopted the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act it also enacted
§ 181.76(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes to allow nonprofit corporations previously or-
ganized under Chapter 180, the Business Corporation Law, to elect to be organized
under Chapter 181, the Nonstock Corporation Law. Section 180.97(1) of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes was enacted to define the application of Chapter 180 to those nonprofit
corporations previously organized on a stock basis. A 1958 attorney general opinion
construed this new section as prohibiting nonprofit corporations from organizing on a
stock basis subsequent to July 1, 1953. 47 Op. Atty. Gen. 78 (1958).
21. Brown, supra note 3, at 59.
22. MacFarlan, Nonprofit Corporation Statute Trends, TRENDS IN NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS LAW 21, 27 (1977).
23. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 509.
24. Sherrill, Mixture of Profit and Nonprofit Purposes, TRENDS IN NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS LAW 115, 115-20 (1977); Weeks, The Not-For-Profit Business Corpo-
ration, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303, 308 (1970).
25. MacFarlan, supra note 22, at 25. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7311 (Purdon
1981); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201 (McKinney 1970).
26. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.03 (Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
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been interpreted to permit the pursuit of any purpose that is
not inconsistent with the nondistribution constraint.27 Con-
sequently, it has been suggested that the absence of an ex-
press prohibition of business purposes may indirectly permit
this blend.28
There is mixed reaction to this new trend in nonprofit
corporations.29 Some commentators suggest that this trend
will "open a broad and productive area for nonprofits. '30
This "hybrid," it is suggested, could be a "versatile tool" to
"aid in the economic or social rehabilitation of the needy."'3'
Others, however, question "[tihe wisdom of tempting an in-
dividual with revenues he has produced but may not
share. ' 32 The hybrid corporation, it is suggested, "creates a
new area that is susceptible to abuse. '33
Gradually, the distinctions between shareholders and
members are being blurred as members' rights and duties
are beginning to resemble those of shareholders.34 For ex-
ample, a number of states have enacted statutes giving mem-
bers the right to notice of meetings and the right to demand
and inspect corporate records The New York Not-for-
Profit Corporation Law allows members to enter into voting
agreements. 6 California and those states adopting the
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act permit voting rights to be
modified, enlarged or minimized in the articles or bylaws.37
Some states specifically allow corporations to become mem-
tit. 18, § 852 (West 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-401 (1979); Wis. STAT. § 181.03
(1979).
27. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 511.
28. Sherrill, supra note 24, at 115-16.
29. For favorable reaction, see generally Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation-A
Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age, 22 Bus. LAW. 951 (1967); Weeks, The Not-For-
Proflit Business Corporation, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 303 (1970). Contra Oleck, Proprie-
tary Mentality and the New Non-Proft Corporation Laws, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 145
(1971).
30. Sherrill, supra note 24, at 116.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 117.
33. Id.
34. MacFarlan, supra note 22, at 28.
35. Id. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 7508, 7783 (Purdon 1981).
36. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 619 (McKinney 1970).
37. MacFarlan, supra note 22, at 27. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 5330,
7330, 9330 (West Supp. 1981); MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 15 (1964);
Wis. STAT. § 181.16 (1979).
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bers of nonprofit corporations and thus permit control of
these nonprofit organizations through holding companies.3
These new trends in nonprofit corporate law are viewed
by some critics as inconsistent with traditional nonprofit
principles.39 In particular, section 15 of the Model Act, al-
lowing voting fights to be varied, is viewed as encouraging
nonprofit corporations to take on a "proprietary mental-
ity."' 40 The right to vote is the basic means of control in
many nonprofit corporations.4 Unequal voting rights plus
the use of voting agreements will permit a few members "to
fasten their personal control onto a non-profit corpora-
tion. ' 42 Attempts to gain control amount to conduct which
inherently contradicts the proper purpose of the nonprofit
corporation.43 Such concentration of control is offensive to
those who believe that nonprofit corporations should be
democratically controlled by their membership.
Part of the concern in this area is that nonprofit enter-
prises sweep "far beyond the realm of actual or pretended
charity." 44 Many nonprofit corporations "deliberately and
habitually generate income substantially in excess of their
fixed and recurrent costs. ' 45  Nonprofit statutes "host far
more than a handful of do-gooder organizations," which are
"organized for a bewildering variety of goals. ' 46 "There are
estimates that nonprofit entities employ more persons than
federal, state and local government combined. '47 They are
"the second largest source of employment" in the country.48
38. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 601 (McKinney 1981); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7760 (Purdon 1981); Wis. STAT. § 181.02(7) (1979).
39. MacFarlan, supra note 22, at 27.
40. Id.; Oleck, supra note 29, at 146.
41. Oleck, supra note 29, at 155.
42. Id. at 162.
43. Id.
44. Fessler, supra note 8, at 544.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 545. Some surprising examples include: "The Aerospace Corporation,
a nonprofit [corporation] which receives over $100,000,000 worth of government con-
tracts every year;, The National Federation of Independent Businesses, which repre-
sents almost 60,000 small businesses across the country; The Automobile Club of
Southern California, which has receipts of $120,000,000 a year;, and The California
Trucking Association, which is the trade association for more than 500 trucking orga-
nizations and has yearly sales in excess of $100,000,000." Id. at 545-46 n.6.
47. Id. at 546.
48. Id.
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The degree and nature of supervision over nonprofit cor-
porations is minimal.49 "Under the typical statutory frame-
work those in control of a nonprofit entity are virtually
unchecked.'50  Self-perpetuating boards are "free of the
term and election requirements imposed upon their counter-
parts in [business] corporations. "51 While in theory there are
no proprietary rights with respect to nonprofit corporations,
an officer's or director's unchecked ability to exercise domin-
ion over the corporation's assets and affairs borders peril-
ously close to the definition of ownership.5 2
As myths about nonprofit corporations are dispelled,
nonprofit corporate directors, officers and members may find
themselves exposed to personal liability. In particular, as the
"staggering" wealth 53 of many nonprofit corporations be-
comes known, creditors and tort victims may assert claims
that the nonprofit corporation is really the arm or instrumen-
tality of those controlling members. The court may then be
asked to "pierc[e] the corporate veil" 54 and hold those mem-
bers personally liable.
B. The Disregard Doctrine
Limited liability means that the shareholders of a corpo-
ration are not personally liable for the debts, liabilities and
obligations of the corporation. 56 When a court decides to
disregard the separate entity and pierce the veil behind
which the shareholders, directors and officers are hiding, the
court will regard the corporation as merely an association of
persons57 and will hold personally liable those persons re-
sponsible for the alleged wrongdoing. Application of this
49. Id.
50. Id. at 549.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Henn & Boyd, supra note 4, at 1104 n.3.
54. Broida, The History Of The Development Of The Remedy Of "Piercing The
Corporate Veil," 65 ILL. B.J. 522, 523 (1977).
55. See Macaluso v. Jenkins, 95 Ill. App. 3d 461, 420 N.E.2d 251 (1981); Ruppa
v. American States Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 628, 284 N.W.2d 318 (1979).
56. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing The Veil OfLimited Liability, 4 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 351, 353 (1979).
57. Id. at 354.
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remedy is generally limited to close corporations58 and par-
ent-subsidiary corporations. 59
Most courts "have recognized the legitimacy of incorpo-
rating to avoid personal liability;" 60 mere desire to avoid
personal liability will not cause a court to pierce the corpo-
rate veil.61 That is the clearest guideline a court has given to
indicate when the doctrine will not be applied. Precise rules
determining when the doctrine will be applied are rarely ar-
ticulated. Instead, a "totality of the circumstances" 62 rule is
employed by courts to enable them to deal with each case on
its own facts. 63 Courts defend the doctrine's obscure form by
contending that its equitable nature demands that it be flex-
ible and adaptable.64
Traditionally, courts would pierce the corporate veil
when a fraud or misrepresentation occurred which
prejudiced a third party.65 Then the corporation was treated
as a partnership and all of the shareholders were held liable
as partners.66 However, to hold all of the shareholders per-
sonally liable for the wrongful conduct of one shareholder or
director would create tremendous injustice. Consequently,
this practice has been discarded by many courts.67 In its
place a two-tiered test has generally been accepted.68 Under
58. Note, Disregard ofthe Corporate Entity, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 333, 336
(1978). There is no case in which the shareholders of a corporation whose stock was
publicly traded or widely held was found personally liable for the obligation of the
corporation. Barber, Piercing The Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE L.J. 371, 372
(1981).
59. Note, supra note 58, at 336.
60. Barber, supra note 58, at 373.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 374.
63. Id. See, e.g., Horticultural Enters. Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 477 F. Supp. 161
(C.D. Cal. 1979); Brown Bros. Equip. Co. v. State, 51 Mich. App. 448, 452, 215
N.W.2d 591, 593 (1974).
64. Gillespie, The Thin Corporate Line: Loss of Limited Liabili Protection, 45
N.D.L. REv. 363, 365 (1969).
65. Note, supra note 58, at 338.
66. Id. at 345.
67. See Harris, Washington's Doctrine ofCorporate Disregard, 56 WASH. L. REv.
253, 253 (1981).
68. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir.
1981); Horticultural Enters. Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 477 F. Supp. 161, 165 (C.D.
Cal. 1979); Tri-State Bldg. Corp. v. Moore-Handley, Inc., 333 So. 2d 840, 841 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1976); Home Builders & Suppliers v. Timberman, 75 Ariz. 337,-, 256 P.2d
716, 721 (1953); Futch v. Southern Stores, Inc., 380 So. 2d 444, 445-46 (Fla. App.
1982]
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that test, a court will pierce a corporate veil when two facts
have been established:
(1) such a unity of interest and ownership between the
corporation and its shareholders that the individuality
of the corporation has ceased, and
(2) the observance of the entity would sanction a fraud or
promote injustice. 9
This test has sometimes been labeled as the "alter ego"
rule.7 ° While the above standard lends some clarity to the
doctrine, the application of those two criteria to particular
cases often is clouded, inconsistent and even contradictory.7
Frequently, courts obscure their analyses by couching their
decisions in terms of metaphors that offer no insights into
their reasoning.72 Factors courts balance in determining
whether the two-tiered test has been met include the com-
mingling of the funds and assets of the corporations, failure
to observe corporate formalities, failure to maintain corpo-
rate records or minutes, inadequate capitalization, sole own-
1980); Chick v. Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483,-, 531 P.2d 573, 575 (1975); Berlinger's Inc.
v. Beef's Finest, Inc., 57 Ill. App. 3d 319, -, 372 N.E.2d 1043, 1048 (1978); Service
Iron Foundry v. M.A. Bell Co., 2 Kan. App. 2d 662, -, 588 P.2d 463, 473 (1978);
Soloman v. Western Hills Dev. Co., 110 Mich. App. 257, -, 312 N.W.2d 428, 432
(1981); Frank McCleary Cattle Co. v. Sewell, 73 Nev. 279, -, 317 P.2d 957, 959
(1957); Village Press, Inc. v. Stephen Edward Co., 120 N.H. 469, 416 A.2d 1373, 1375
(1980); Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979).
69. Note, supra note 58, at 352. See also I W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 41
(Supp. 1981); Harris, supra note 67, at 258; Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil in
Louisiana, 22 Loy. L. REv. 993, 1000-01 (1976).
70. Note, supra note 58, at 352.
71. See, e.g., Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1980); Fink v. Mont-
gomery Elevator Co., 161 Colo. 342, 421 P.2d 735 (1966); Chung v. Animal Clinic,
Inc., 636 P.2d 721 (Hawaii 1981); Commonwealth ex rel Beshear v. ABAC Pest Con-
trol, 621 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); William B. Roberts, Inc. v. McDrilling Co.,
579 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Block v. Olympic Health Spa, 24 Wash. App.
938, 604 P.2d 1317 (1979). See generally Jonas v. State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 121 N.W.2d
235 (1963); 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 41.
72. The courts conclude that the corporation is the "alter ego," "mere adjunct,"
"instrumentality," "cloak," or "arm" of the controlling shareholder. Hamilton, The
Corporate Entity, 49 Tax. L. REV. 979, 979 (1971). Although the purpose of the meta-
phor policy ostensibly is to point to some improper relationship between the share-
holder and the corporation, the language merely states legal conclusions and provides
no guidelines. Note, supra note 58, at 352. Justice Cardozo, commenting on the dis-
regard doctrine in Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926), sug-
gested that a misunderstanding of the metaphors used presented a danger to the
corporate theory. Id. at -, 155 N.E. at 61.
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ership of all shares, inequitable conduct, lack of arm's length
transactions and manipulation of corporate assets.73
There are inherent problems in applying this two-tiered
test to nonprofit corporations. First, since members do not
own the corporation, some substitute for unity of ownership
and interest is necessary. Second, since nonprofit corpora-
tions are by nature different from profit corporations, some
standard for determining inequitable conduct must be
established.
II. DISREGARDING THE NONPROFIT CORPORATE ENTITY
A. Who Will Be Liable?
With the exception of only a few cases, 74 the corporate
disregard doctrine has been invoked successfully to impose
personal liability only against shareholders of business cor-
porations.75 The rationale in such a case is that since the
shareholder's interests have become inseparable from that of
the corporation in the pursuit of profit and financial growth,
the shareholder is no longer distinct from the corporation
and, therefore, should be personally liable for the corpora-
tion's debts and obligations.76 Applying that same rationale
to a nonprofit corporation which has no shareholders, but
has members who pay minimal dues77 and expect no
financial return on their contributions,78 presents some
knotty problems.
Most courts consider unity of ownership and interest be-
tween the shareholder and the corporation an essential ele-
ment in their decision to disregard.79 Although members of
73. Barber, supra note 58, at 374-75.
74. See Macaluso v. Jenkins, 95 I1. App. 3d 461, 420 N.E.2d 251 (1981); Macfad-
den v. Macfadden, 46 N.J. Super. 242, 134 A.2d 531 (1957). The corporate disregard
doctrine has been unsuccessfully invoked to impose personal liability in: Jabczenski
v. Southern Pac. Memorial Hosps., 119 Ariz. 15, 579 P.2d 53 (1978); Revere Press, Inc.
v. Blumberg, 431 Pa. 370,246 A.2d 407 (1968); Ruppa v. American States Ins. Co., 91
Wis. 2d 628, 284 N.W.2d 318 (1979).
75. Gillespie, supra note 64, at 372-73 n.38.
76. Harris, supra note 67, at 258.
77. Gillespie, supra note 64, at 372-73 n.38.
78. Brown, supra note 3, at 61.
79. See, e.g., Berlinger's Inc. v. Beefs Finest, Inc., 57 IM. App. 3d 319, -, 372
N.E.2d 1043, 1048 (1978); Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 493,
495, 234 N.W. 748, 749 (1931). See also Harris, supra note 67, at 258; Comment,
supra note 69, at 1000-01; Note, supra note 58, at 352.
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nonprofit corporations do not own shares, they generally do
have the right to vote on matters designated in the articles of
incorporation or bylaws.80 Moreover, an active member of a
nonprofit corporation naturally has a personal interest in the
corporation.8' While the right to vote does give members
control over corporate affairs similar to that of shareholders,
that coupled with inequitable conduct should not become
the basis for applying the doctrine. Otherwise, members
may be subjected to personal liability whenever the equities
of the case would merit a shifting of responsibility from the
claimant. Instead the courts should adopt a test which sub-
stitutes active control and dominion for unity of ownership
and interest.
1. The Ownership Control Approach
The Illinois Court of Appeals in Macaluso v. Jenkins8 2
did not find the absence of stock ownership an obstacle to
applying the corporate disregard doctrine. In Macaluso,
John Jenkins founded a nonprofit corporation named the In-
dustrial Police Association (I.P.A.); he was the treasurer and
chairman of the board. On behalf of the corporation, Jen-
kins entered into a contract with Frank Macaluso to have
some printing done. When the contract price was not paid,
Macaluso sought to have Jenkins and Paulette Zecca, an-
other director of the corporation, held personally liable by
means of the corporate disregard doctrine.
The court quickly rejected the defendants' argument that
the ownership requirement of the disregard doctrine could
not be met because Jenkins did not own any shares. Instead,
the court relied on the fact that Jenkins exhibited "owner-
ship control. '8 3 Ownership control was exhibited by Jen-
kins' power to authorize loans to the corporation, make
decisions about seminars held by the corporation, appoint a
vice-president, make most or all of the decisions affecting the
corporation and unilaterally start and dissolve an office in
80. See supra notes 37 & 41 and accompanying text.
81. Revere Press, Inc. v. Blumberg, 431 Pa. 370, -, 246 A.2d 407, 411 (1968).
82. 95 Ill. App. 3d 461, 420 N.E.2d 251 (1981).
83. Id. at -, 420 N.E.2d at 256.
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Florida.84 Moreover, Jenkins himself demonstrated his own-
ership control when he testified at trial that the other direc-
tor had no input into making decisions concerning the
corporation.85 This ownership control exhibited by Jenkins
was sufficient to show that the separate personalities of the
corporation and Jenkins had ceased to exist. 86 The corpora-
tion had become the "alter ego" of Jenkins.87
Since the doctrine of disregard is essentially equitable in
nature,88 the Illinois court concluded that the corporation's
nonprofit status did not bar the court from applying the doc-
trine. Equitable remedies, the court maintained, look to
substance rather than to form.89 Jenkins' conduct alone was
sufficient to demonstrate that he and the corporation had
ceased to exist as separate entities.
While the ownership control principle appears to be a
logically consistent substitute for the ownership requirement
of the disregard doctrine, it does not clearly define the de-
gree of ownership control that may be exerted before a court
will find members personally liable. In Macaluso, the plain-
tiff also sought to hold Paulette Zecca, the secretary and di-
rector, liable for the contract price. The court declined to do
that, maintaining that Zecca did not exercise "sufficient
ownership and control to be the alter ego" of the
corporation.90
In reaching its conclusion as to Zecca, the Illinois court
focused on a rather limited set of facts. The court explained
that Zecca was only a part-time voluntary clerical worker
who occasionally made out checks authorized by Jenkins. 91
In addition, the court emphasized that Zecca, although the
secretary, never assumed responsibility for the financial
records.92 Emphasis was also placed on Zecca's testimony at
trial that she merely followed Jenkins' orders and had no
84. Id. at -, 420 N.E.2d at 255.
85. Id.
86. Id. at -, 420 N.E.2d at 256.
87. Id. at -, 420 N.E.2d at 257.
88. Id. at -, 420 N.E.2d at 255.
89. Id.





input into any decision making.93 Without any further con-
siderations, the court concluded that Zecca was merely a
clerical volunteer for the corporation.
Zecca's other ties with Jenkins and his corporations were
ignored by the court. Prior to incorporating the I.P.A., Jen-
kins had founded a corporation which provided armed
guards for industrial sites. Zecca was the assistant director
of security for that corporation. Out of the same offices in
which Jenkins ran the above corporation, a private investi-
gation firm and the I.P.A., Zecca operated a cleaning service.
Moreover, evidence indicated that Zecca's cleaning service
paid the rent for the offices, 94 although the original plan was
to have I.P.A. pay the rent.95 Zecca's corporation also
loaned over $9,000 to the I.P.A.96 While these additional
facts may not be sufficient to establish that Zecca did exer-
cise ownership control over I.P.A., they nonetheless indicate
that Zecca was more closely tied to I.P.A. than an ordinary,
part-time volunteer clerk would be.
The substance-form argument of the Macaluso court
may be a debatable premise. In many respects, the position
of a member in a nonprofit corporation differs in substance
from that of a shareholder.97 While a member of a nonprofit
corporation may benefit from the corporation's existence
and prefer that it survive and prosper, no immediate eco-
nomic loss will result from its demise.98 Since the ban on
distributions prohibits those who control a nonprofit organi-
zation from distributing to themselves out of the corpora-
tion's income, the most that can be lost is any reasonable
compensation they receive for the services they render.99
Usually that will be a minimal amount since many members
offer their services gratuitously.100 Moreover, members may
easily withdraw from a nonprofit corporation if they lose in-
terest or are disappointed. Their only loss is the forfeited
93. Id.
94. Id. at -, 420 N.E.2d at 254.
95. Id. at-, 420 N.E.2d at 255-56.
96. Id. at-, 420 N.E.2d at 257.
97. Brown, supra note 3, at 61.
98. Id.; Henn & Boyd, supra note 4, at 1135.
99. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 505.
100. Henn & Boyd, supra note 4, at 1129 n.210.
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dues. On the other hand, shareholders who withdraw forfeit
the value of their investments unless they can find eager
buyers.
It is recognized, however, that a nonprofit corporation
can be operated as if it were a close profit corporation. Di-
rectors and officers can seize control and run the corporation
as if they were the owners. 10 1 The founder of a nonprofit
corporation can structure it so that he or she is the only
member and, therefore, able to choose all members of the
board and all of the officers. 02 Moreover, as suggested ear-
lier, many nonprofit corporations have self-perpetuating
boards which are immune from the dismay of the mem-
bers.103 This "unchecked ability to remain in nonaccount-
able indefinite dominion over its assets and affairs borders
on 'ownership.'"l4 Aside from the ban on distributions,
such a nonprofit corporation would differ little from many
close profit corporations. Therefore, if courts apply the prin-
ciples of the disregard doctrine consistently to nonprofit cor-
porations, they will not allow dominant members of a
nonprofit corporation to hide behind the corporate shell.
Rather, since those members treat that corporation as their
own property, they may also be held personally liable for the
debts and obligations of that corporation.
2. Nonprofit Corporations Without Members
Generally, nonprofit corporations can be divided into
two categories: public benefit (charitable) corporations and
mutual benefit corporations.10 5 As their names suggest, mu-
tual benefit corporations are formed for the benefit of the
members10 6 while public benefit corporations are formed for
some charitable purpose. 0 7 While all mutual benefit corpo-
rations by definition have members, there are many public
101. Oleck, Non-Profit Types, Uses andAbuses: 1970, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 207,
233 (1970). In another commentary, Oleck maintained that as many as one-half of all
nonprofit corporations are run by individuals or small groups. Oleck, supra note 29,
at 165. See also Fessler, supra note 8, at 549.
102. Ellman, supra note 5, at 156 n.10.
103. Fessler, supra note 8, at 549; Oleck, supra note 29, at 162.
104. Fessler, supra note 8, at 549.





benefit corporations that do not. 0 8 Several states expressly
provide that nonprofit corporations may be formed with or
without members. 10 9 If there are no members, then the di-
rectors decide the matters usually left to the vote of the
members.110
Two problems arise when one tries to hold the directors
of a nonprofit corporation personally liable under the disre-
gard doctrine. First, unlike the directors of most close profit
corporations, the directors of nonprofit corporations do not
own any shares and may not even pay any dues."' Conse-
quently, stretching the ownership control principle to these
directors appears less congruent. Second, there is confusion
in many jurisdictions as to whether corporate law or trust
law should be used to evaluate the directors' conduct. 12
A trustee status for directors presents some problems.
"Under the trust concept, legal title to the assets vests in the
trustees, and the equitable interest vests in passive benefi-
ciaries." ' 1 3 Such a division of interest "is inconsistent with
the corporate form,"'" 4 and general confusion results from
perpetuating the application of outdated trust law to non-
profit corporations. 1 5 The trust standard also subjects the
directors to the highest standard of care and fiduciary con-
duct. 16 Since many directors of nonprofit organizations
often "perform their directors' duties as an avocation or
community service,"'"1 7 applying this test may discourage
such service.""
108. Fessler, supra note 8, at 558.
109. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-3-100 (1975); CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 5310,
7310, 9310 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-2501 (1977); Wis STAT. § 181.11
(1979).
110. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 5310(b), 7310(b) (West Supp. 1981);
MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION AcT § 15. See also Henn & Boyd, supra note 4, at
1129.
111. See Brown, supra note 3, at 58-59; Oleck, Trends in Nonprofit Corporation
Law in 1976, 10 AKRON L. REv. 71, 84 (1976).
112. Brown, supra note 3, at 67.
113. Henn & Boyd, supra note 4, at 1129.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1129 n.210.
116. Id. at 1129-30.




The directors of many nonprofit corporations rarely re-
ceive compensation for their services."l 9 Since they cannot
expect a return on any contributions they make, they often
will not suffer any financial loss from the dissolution of the
corporation. 120 Consequently, to apply the ownership prin-
ciple to the directors, the courts will have to examine and
balance the conduct of each director in each case in order to
decide if a particular director handled the corporation's as-
sets to further his or her own personal interest.12 '
There is support for the proposition that the directors of
public benefit corporations should be held to a higher stan-
dard of care in the performance of their duties. 122 Since the
funds are derived from public donations123 and they are to
be used to benefit the public, supporters argue that the cor-
poration more closely resembles a charitable trust than a
business corporation. 124 Therefore, they argue that it is im-
proper to apply a corporate standard to the actions of the
governing bodies solely because of the organizational
structure. 1
25
Applying a higher standard of care to the directors of a
nonprofit corporation may encourage the directors to exert
more dominance and control over the corporate assets to sat-
isfy their fiduciary duties. 126 On the other hand, if this con-
duct is interpreted as using corporate assets for their own
personal use, the directors may be held personally liable for
the corporate obligations.
These complications do not arise in a profit corporation
setting because the fiduciary duty concept is not involved.
While many shareholders in close corporations are also di-
rectors and officers, the court, in a case involving the disre-
gard doctrine, does not reach a conclusion based on whether
or not the director's fiduciary duty was breached. Emphasis
is placed on finding an ownership and interest unity between
119. Brown, supra note 3, at 61.
120. Id.
121. Ashley v. Ashley, 482 Pa. 228, -, 393 A.2d 637, 641 (1978).
122. Brown, supra note 3, at 64.
123. Fessler, supra note 8, at 555.





the shareholder and the corporation.127 The court's focus
can be narrow in these situations, unlike those involving
public benefit corporations, because the role of shareholder
and director can at least in theory be separated.
There is also growing support for the proposition that di-
rectors of public benefit corporations should be charged with
the same standard of fidelity to the donors or patrons as are
directors of profit corporations.1 28 Supporters of that view
stress the part-time and uncompensated status of the major-
ity of the directors of nonprofit corporations. 129 They also
emphasize that directors of public benefit corporations have
powers and duties similar to those of directors of profit cor-
porations. 130 While this approach does not make it easier to
decide if a director's conduct exhibits an ownership mental-
ity, it does eliminate some of the tension between the disre-
gard doctrine and the fiduciary duty concept.
B. The Needfor a Clear Standard
The standards applied to profit corporations are con-
fused and convoluted. While some jurisdictions still cling to
the traditional fraud approach,131 others have adopted the
two-pronged standard. 32 No matter which test is expressly
espoused, the courts still apply these tests inconsistently.
33
Frequently, the type, nature, mode of operation, purpose
and resources of each corporation are ignored in framing the
standards and assessing the justice of a particular result.13 4
Courts have also failed to make distinctions between the
standard applied when the claim asserted is a breach of con-
127. See, e.g., Berlinger's Inc. v. Beef's Finest, Inc., 57 III. App. 3d 319, -, 372
N.E.2d 1043, 1048 (1978); Jonas v. State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 644-45, 121 N.W.2d 235, 239
(1963).
128. Brown, supra note 3, at 70. See, e.g., Beard v. Achenbach Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, 170 F.2d 859, 862 (10th Cir. 1948).
129. Brown, supra note 3, at 70.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Delta Airlines v. Wilson, 210 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Schriock v. Schriock, 128 N.W.2d 852 (N.D. 1964); Brundred v. Rice, 49 Ohio St. 640,
-, 32 N.E. 169, 172 (1892); Note, supra note 58, at 338.
132. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
134. See Note, supra note 58, at 355.
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tract claim as opposed to a tort claim.1 35 Applying these
muddled standards to the already unsettled area of nonprofit
corporate law only creates more confusion.
When a fraud is involved, a court will often disregard the
corporate entity and hold the wrongdoer liable for the in-
jury. 136 However, there must be sufficient identity of the cor-
poration with the culprits and the fraudulent conduct. 137
The same rules apply to nonprofit corporations. If a fraudu-
lent purpose or use of a nonpecuniary association is estab-
lished, a court of equity has the power to pierce the
corporate entity even though there are no shareholders and
its formation ostensibly is in the public interest.1 38
For example, in Macfadden v. Macfadden139 the court
pierced the corporate entity on the grounds that recognition
of the corporate form would create an injustice. In Macfad-
den the plaintiffs husband, as part of a settlement agree-
ment, gave his wife a life estate in real estate held by one of
the nonprofit corporations he controlled. Upon his death,
the corporation tried to sell the land. The court disregarded
the corporate form and held that the land was subject to the
wife's life estate. 4
1. Measuring Inequitable Conduct
Traditionally, a finding of fraud was necessary to invoke
the disregard doctrine;' 4 1 remnants of that requirement still
exist. Those jurisdictions following the two-pronged test still
require proof of some inequitable conduct as a condition of
applying the doctrine. 42 This heavy burden is placed on the
claimant because of the strong policy favoring limited liabil-
135. Id.
136. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 44.
137. Id.
138. Macfadden v. Macfadden, 46 N.J. Super. 242, -, 134 A.2d 531, 534 (1957);
1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 44.
139. 46 N.J. Super. 242, 134 A.2d 531 (1957).
140. Id. at -, 134 A.2d at 535.
141. Barber, supra note 58, at 338.
142. Central Inv. Corp. v. Mutual Leasing Assoc., 523 F. Supp. 74,78 (S.D. Ohio
1981) (need proof of fraud or inequitable conduct); Cooperman v. California Unem-
ployment Ins. App. Bd., 49 Cal. App. 3d 1, -, 122 Cal. Rptr. 127, 131 (1975) ("corpo-
rate entity will be disregarded to prevent fraud, to protect third persons or to prevent
grave injustice"). See generally, 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, §§ 25, 41.
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ity1 43 Since the remedy is equitable, the court balances the
policy of maintaining limited liability against the injustices
that may result if the corporate form is kept intact. 44
While each court may express the requirements of this
second prong differently, each court is looking for conduct
that will swing the balance in favor of the claimant. Wash-
ington courts require shareholder conduct which exhibits
fraud, misrepresentation or some form of manipulation of
the corporation so as to benefit the shareholder while harm-
ing the claimant.145 Similarly, Wisconsin and Illinois courts
consider whether adherence to the fiction of separate exist-
ence would sanction a fraud or defeat some strong equitable
claim.14
6
Clearer guidelines than those expressed above are
needed to define what kind of inequitable conduct will cause
the court to impose personal liability on the members of
nonprofit corporations. When fraud is involved the answer
is easy. However, inequitable conduct as defined by a vari-
ety of courts has included the commingling of corporate as-
sets, 147 the failure to maintain adequate corporate records
and to comply with corporate formalities, 14 the draining of
corporate assets by drawing large salaries,149 thin capitaliza-
tion1150 and sole ownership of all stock.' 5 1
Most courts have maintained that sole ownership of all
stock is not sufficient cause to pierce the corporate veil.' 52
143. Harris, supra note 67, at 253. California and Pennsylvania expressly provide
by statute that members of a nonprofit corporation are not personally liable for the
debts, liabilities or obligations of the corporation. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN.
§§ 5350(a), 7350(a), 9350(a) (West Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7554(a)
(Purdon 1981). In the absence of a similar statutory enactment, members of nonprofit
corporations would enjoy limited liability by virtue of the doctrine's common law
origin.
144. Note, supra note 58, at 335-36.
145. See, e.g., Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wash. 2d 580, -, 611 P.2d 751, 756 (1980).
146. Berlinger's Inc. v. Beefs Finest, Inc., 57 Ill. App. 3d 319, -, 372 N.E.2d
1043, 1048 (1978); Jonas v. State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 644, 121 N.W.2d 235, 238-39 (1963).
147. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 58, at 374.
148. Id. at 374-75.
149. See Sprecher v. Weston's Bar, 78 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 253 N.W. 493, 498 (1976).
150. See, e.g., Id.; Harris, supra note 67, at 266.
151. See Berlinger's Inc. v. Beef's Finest, Inc., 57 Ill. App. 3d 319,-, 372 N.E.2d
1043, 1048-49 (1978).
152. Cooperman v. California Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 49 Cal. App. 3d 1,
122 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1975); Barnes v. Finnegan Enters., 150 Ga. App. 430, 258 S.E.2d
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The rationale is that sole ownership does not destroy the cor-
poration's separate existence. Similarly, sole control by a
member of a nonprofit corporation should not be sufficient
cause to disregard the corporation's separate entity. In Mac-
aluso, Jenkins' sole control over the I.P.A. was not the deter-
mining factor in the court's decision. Rather, the court
carefully scrutinized Jenkins' conduct as a whole to deter-
mine whether upholding I.P.A.'s separate existence would
promote an injustice. 53
The commingling of corporate assets was a significant
factor in the court's determination in Macaluso. The court
relied on evidence demonstrating that Jenkins drew funds
from I.P.A.'s accounts and transferred them to his other cor-
porations. 54 Also stressed was the original agreement that
I.P.A. would pay the phone bills and rentals for the offices
which housed all of the businesses. 55 Especially in view of
the ban placed on dividends and distributions, this factor
provides a sound basis to apply the disregard doctrine to
nonprofit corporations. Because no uniform accounting
standards have been applied to nonprofit corporations, 56
however, the commingling of corporate assets may not be an
easy practice to spot. Moreover, since no national law re-
quires public benefit corporations to account for the ways
their contributions are disbursed, misappropriations and il-
legal distributions to members may be difficult to detect. 57
The court in Macaluso also considered Jenkins' failure to
follow corporate formalities and keep corporate records.
Evidence demonstrated that during I.P.A.'s operation no
books or financial records were ever kept. 58 However, it
seems that that factor was not as prominent as Jenkins'
handling of the corporate assets.
55 (1979); Baird & Warner, Inc. v. Addison Indus. Park, 70 Ill. App. 3d 59, 387
N.E.2d 831 (1979); Service Iron Foundry v. M.A. Bell Co., 2 Kan. App. 2d 662, 588
P.2d 463 (1978); Block v. Olympia Health Spa, 24 Wash. App. 938, 604 P.2d 1317
(1979); Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 784 (1931).
153. Macaluso v. Jenkins, 95 Ill. App. 3d 461, -, 420 N.E.2d 251, 255-56 (1981).
154. Id. at -, 420 N.E.2d at 256.
155. Id.
156. Oleck, supra note 1, at 969,
157. Id.
158. 95 Ill. App. 3d at -, 420 N.E.2d at 256.
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Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Ruppa v.
American States Insurance Co.,'19 rejected the absence of
corporate formalities as a sufficient reason to disregard the
separate entity of a nonprofit corporation. The plaintiff in
that case wanted the members of the Madison Saddle Club
to be held personally liable for the injfries he sustained as a
participant in one of the horse shows the club sponsored.
The only grounds he offered as a basis to invoke the disre-
gard doctrine were that the business was conducted infor-
mally, the club had no regular meeting place, the mail was
received at the secretary's place of employment and the
club's only asset was a bank account. 60 Since Ruppa failed
to prove fraud or inequitable conduct as required by the
Wisconsin test, the court held that there were insufficient
grounds to disregard the corporate status of the club. 16
The factor that figured most prominently in the court's
conclusions in Macaluso was Jenkins' treatment of the cor-
porate assets. Evidence demonstrated that he was depleting
the corporation of its minimal assets for his own personal
benefit. Jenkins used I.P.A.'s funds to pay for his auto re-
pairs, his restaurant tabs and charitable contributions. 162
Funds were directly drawn in his name or to cash. 63 Jen-
kins even helped a friend make a payment on the friend's
Florida condominium.' 64 This conduct led the court to con-
clude that Jenkins used "'the corporate entity for his own
personal benefit to the exclusion of the plaintiff, and thereby
[became] unjustly enriched at the expense of corporate credi-
tors.' ",165 In keeping with the equitable nature of the rem-
edy, the personal use of corporate assets and the
commingling of corporate funds should figure most promi-
nently in a court's decision to disregard the corporate status
of a nonprofit corporation.
2. Inadequate Capitalization as a Standard
The use of inadequate capitalization as a determining
factor has stirred debate in cases involving profit corpora-
159. 91 Wis. 2d at 628, 284 N.W.2d 318 (1979).
160. Id. at 645, 284 N.W.2d at 325.
161. Id. at 645, 284 N.W.2d at 324-25.






tions. 16 6 Since some nonprofit corporations are minimally
capitalized through membership dues and outside contribu-
tions, thin capitalization may be an issue in cases in which
the claimant requests that the corporate form be disre-
garded. Consequently, some basis for determining what
constitutes inadequate capitalization must be devised. In
evaluating profit corporations, courts look to whether the
capital put at risk by the shareholders is grossly dispropor-
tionate to the nature of the business and the risks reasonably
foreseeable from its operation. 67 The rationale is that indi-
viduals should not be able to transfer their risks of doing
business to innocent members of the general public by use of
the corporate form. 68
Courts must decide at what time the adequacy of capital
will be judged. While some courts look only to initial capi-
tal, 169 this approach is criticized as ignoring the fact that cor-
porations suffer losses and incur other liabilities during their
operation. 70 The better view, it is argued, is to look at the
entire economic position of the corporation and then assess
whether the corporation affords adequate protection to its
creditors.' 7 1
It is generally accepted that inadequate capitalization
alone should not upset the corporate status of a profit corpo-
ration. 72 Other factors indicating some inequitable conduct
by the shareholders must also be present. A similar view
was taken by the courts in both Ruppa and Macaluso. In
Ruppa the court ignored the fact that the club's only asset
was a single bank account. It was sufficient that the club
"obtained public and liability and property damage insur-
ance to be in force during the horse show."'' 73 Because the
166. See generally Barber, supra note 58; Note, supra note 58; Note, Disregarding
The Corporate Fiction In Florida: The Need For Specfics, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 175
(1974).
167. Note, supra note 58, at 359; 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 413 (Supp.
1981).
168. Note, supra note 58, at 360 n.172.
169. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 56, at 354.
170. Comment, supra note 69, at 1013-14.
171. Id. at 1014. See also Note, supra note 58, at 362.
172. Note, supra note 58, at 359; 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 41.3.
173. 91 Wis. 2d at 640, 284 N.W.2d at 322-23.
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club's past history was free of any accidents, the court ig-
nored the fact that the insurance policy did not cover bodily
injury or the death of any person participating in the
show. 74 In Macaluso, the court dismissed the complaint of
undercapitalization on the ground that Macaluso assumed
the risk through his knowledge of I.P.A.'s minimal assets
and his consent to enter into a contract. 75
It appears from these two cases that inadequate capitali-
zation alone will not cause the court to hold members per-
sonally liable. In some cases involving nonprofit
corporations, this may be a sound policy. Creditors who
deal with nonprofit corporations are aware of the corpora-
tions' limited assets and the principle of limited liability.
Moreover, creditors of nonprofit corporations should be held
to a duty to investigate because they are in the business sec-
tor.176 Absent some fraudulent or inequitable conduct by
controlling members, inadequate capitalization is not a com-
pelling reason to apply the doctrine.
In contrast, there is support for the idea that a different
standard should be applied to tort claims which by nature
are nonconsensual. It is argued that the failure to follow for-
malities, sole ownership of all the shares and absence of cor-
porate books are irrelevant to a tort claim. 177 Instead, the
concern should be whether the controlling shareholder is re-
sponsible for the operational policies causing the tort and the
undercapitalization. 178
Applying that principle to nonprofit corporations without
some added requirement of inequitable conduct will have a
chilling effect on the growth and operation of many non-
profit corporations. Members and directors will be reluctant
to take on very active roles for fear of incurring personal
liability. 79 A better solution would be legislation that re-
quires nonprofit corporations to carry liability insurance.18 0
174. Id.
175. 95 Il. App. 3d at -, 420 N.E.2d at 257. Accord White v. Winchester Land
Dev. Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
176. Note, supra note 58, at 356.
177. Note, supra note 166, at 181.
178. Id. at 194.
179. Brown, supra note 3, at 60.
180. Barber, supra note 58, at 394.
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The other alternative is for the nonprofit corporation to pro-
vide its active members and/or directors with liability
insurance.'8
C Application in Wisconsin
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ruppa de-
clined to disregard the corporate status of the saddle club, it
seems clear that the court will apply the doctrine in an ap-
propriate case. In Jonas v. State18 2 the court clearly enunci-
ated the test used in applying the disregard doctrine to profit
corporations. It stated that the doctrine would be applied
whenever recognizing the corporate fiction would "accom-
plish some fraudulent purpose, operate as a constructive
fraud, or defeat some strong equitable claim."'' 1 3 Central to
that determination is a finding of unity of interest and own-
ership. As expressed in Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial
Commission,84 the court will look to see if the person "'is
simply dealing with his own property through a corporate
agency as absolutely as he might deal with it as an
individual.' "185
In Ruppa, the court applied the Jonas standard to a non-
profit corporation. In addition, the court cited the test stated
by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Ab-
bott. 86 The Anderson Court established public policy, fraud
and obvious inadequacy of capital as the exceptions to the
rule of limited liability.187 When the Wisconsin court stated
that none of the circumstances justifying disregard was pres-
ent, it appeared to be including both the Jonas and Anderson
criteria.
It seems clear from Ruppa that Wisconsin will apply the
doctrine to a nonprofit corporation only if some fraud or in-
equitable conduct is present. In Ruppa, the court dismissed
181. Oleck, supra note 111, at 90. "Directors' and officers' liability insurance is
now a significant new speciality area in the insurance business." Id.
182. 19 Wis. 2d 638, 121 N.W.2d 235 (1963).
183. Id. at 644, 121 N.W.2d at 238-39 (quoting Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 203 Wis. 493, 496, 234 N.W. 748, 749 (1931)).
184. 203 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 748 (1931).
185. Id. at 495, 234 N.W. at 749.
186. 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
187. Id. at 362.
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the plaintiffs contention that the lack of formalities and in-
adequate capital constituted sufficient grounds. 188 As "mea-
sured by the nature and magnitude of the corporate
undertaking,"' 189 a single bank account was not too little cap-
ital. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the club had no
prior history of accidents.190
The decision in Ruppa is consistent with the court's re-
quirement of fraud or inequitable conduct. In Sprecher v.
Weston's Bar,'91 while the court considered the facts that Ju-
lia Weston dominated the corporation, ignored corporate
formalities and invested little capital, the central considera-
tion of the court was her withdrawal of large salaries so as to
virtually eliminate corporate profits. 192 It was that inequita-
ble conduct which unjustly enriched Weston at the expense
of outside creditors. 93 In Ruppa, on the other hand, the
members of the saddle club drew no salary for their services,
received none of the profits and contributed excess profits to
charities. There was no evidence of such inequitable
conduct.
III. CONCLUSION
As nonprofit corporations expand the kinds of enter-
prises in which they engage, they will be facing new forms of
liability. In particular, as nonprofit corporations begin to re-
semble profit corporations more closely, they will face the
same vulnerability to liability. This includes the disregard
doctrine. To handle these claims, clear standards must be
enunciated which will deal with the absence of ownership
interest and the presence of public interest in many nonprofit
corporations. Special consideration also will have to be
given to the unique nature of nonprofit corporations. Fail-
ure to do this will only lead to greater confusion in an al-
188. 91 Wis. 2d at 645, 285 N.W.2d at 324.
189. 321 U.S. at 362.
190. 91 Wis. 2d at 645, 285 N.W.2d at 325.
191. 78 Wis. 2d 26, 253 N.W.2d 493 (1977).
192. Id. at 39, 253 N.W.2d at 498.
193. Id. at 39, 253 N.W.2d at 499.
[Vol. 66:134
1982] NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 159
ready unsettled area of corporate law and will cause harm to
nonprofit corporations.
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